FAQ
Your questions about
Photonic Layer Security
Answered.
Detailed answers on Carmel, how photonic-layer security works on your fiber, and how it fits with the security and regulations you already work under. Every answer lists its sources, from CyberRidge's own articles and research to independent publications.
HNDL threat7 questions
What is harvest now, decrypt later?
Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) is an attack in which adversaries collect encrypted data today and store it until they can decrypt it in the future. Decryption is expected to become possible with quantum computers and AI advances, which are both bringing this deadline closer. This impending Q-Day is expected to break the public-key algorithms that protect encryption keys.
HNDL matters for any data that must stay confidential for many years, because data intercepted now can be exposed long after it was sent. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) warned about HNDL in a 2023 joint factsheet. On WAN fiber links, optical exfiltration can copy encrypted traffic without interrupting it. That makes data in transit a direct HNDL target.
Sources & further reading
- External
Are harvest now, decrypt later attacks happening today?
US government agencies treat harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) as a current threat. In a 2023 joint factsheet, CISA, NSA and NIST warned that threat actors could be collecting data today that will still need protection in the future. NIST's transition guidance, IR 8547, cites HNDL as a reason to start post-quantum migration now.
Specific HNDL campaigns are rarely confirmed in public, because collecting encrypted traffic is passive and leaves no trace. The ability to intercept fiber traffic, however, is documented. In 2003, an illegal eavesdropping device was found on Verizon's optical network, reportedly aimed at a mutual fund company's quarterly results. Storage is cheap, and encrypted traffic can be kept for years. For data with a long confidentiality life, the risk starts the moment it crosses an exposed link.
Sources & further reading
- External
- External
- ExternalReport on the 2003 optical eavesdropping device on Verizon's network and fiber-tap demonstrationsThe Register ยท 2007
What data is most at risk from harvest now, decrypt later attacks?
The data most at risk from harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) attacks is sensitive data that must stay confidential for many years. Examples include government and defense communications, intelligence, intellectual property, product designs, long-term contracts, medical records, financial records and critical infrastructure plans. Short-lived data, such as one-time login codes, carries low HNDL risk.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
How do quantum computers threaten encryption?
Quantum computers threaten the public-key algorithms used to exchange encryption keys and sign data, such as RSA, ECDH and ECDSA. A large enough quantum computer could break these algorithms and recover the keys. Symmetric encryption such as AES-256, which encrypts the data itself, remains secure against quantum attack.
Most encrypted traffic is protected in two steps. First, a public-key exchange sets up a shared secret key. Then AES uses that key to encrypt the data. An attacker who records both can later break the key exchange, recover the AES key and decrypt the traffic. NIST IR 8547 plans to phase out quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallow them after 2035.
Sources & further reading
- External
Is fiber tapping a real risk, or a theoretical one?
It is a documented, current risk on both land and subsea routes.
Subsea cables
In May 2024 the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. officials had privately warned Google, Meta and other cable owners that repair ships controlled by a Chinese state-linked company could tamper with Pacific undersea cables carrying traffic between the U.S. and Asia. Some of those vessels reportedly switched off their tracking transponders while working near Singapore, Taiwan and Indonesia. Repairs are a known exposure point: fixing a cable means cutting it open and hand-splicing individual fibers, which can leave bare glass accessible for a day or more at each joint.
In Europe, a series of Baltic Sea incidents in 2024 and 2025, including damage to the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia on 25 December 2024 that Finnish authorities linked to the tanker Eagle S, has made the physical vulnerability of seabed infrastructure a mainstream security concern. NATO reporting in 2023โ2024 also tracked Russian vessels such as the Yantar loitering over key transatlantic cable junctions.
Terrestrial networks
On land, the weak points are street cabinets, manholes, splice enclosures and junction boxes. CyberRidge's review of notable tapping incidents includes a tap on Deutsche Telekom trunk lines near Frankfurt Airport and reported use of optical splitters by sabotage teams on civilian telecom nodes in Ukraine.
Tapping usually leaves no trace on the network, so documented cases are the ones that were discovered. The real number is unknown.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeTop 4 Worst Fiber Tapping AttacksCyberRidge Blog
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped During Repair and Maintenance Work?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidge
- ExternalGoogle and Meta warned of Chinese espionage risks to undersea cables (relaying WSJ reporting)SubTel Forum ยท May 2024
- ExternalUS warns Google, Meta about risk of Chinese repair ships tampering with undersea internet cablesBusiness Today ยท May 2024
- External
- External
How easy and cheap is it to tap a fiber?
Much easier than most people assume. In September 2026 CyberRidge published a live demonstration in which a commercially available clip-on optical coupler was attached to a standard fiber carrying live encrypted traffic between two endpoints. The coupler bent off a small fraction of the light, enough to copy 100% of the data stream in real time. No fiber was cut, no alarm was raised, and the two endpoints saw normal, uninterrupted traffic.
Devices like this are sold online. CyberRidge puts typical clip-on couplers at roughly $500โ$2,500 per unit, and its demo used one costing a few hundred dollars.
Common techniques
- Bend (macro-bend) taps: the fiber is bent past its minimum bend radius so light leaks through the cladding into a clamped photodetector. The fiber is never cut.
- Couplers and splitters: a small component diverts a fixed share of the light to a second fiber. A split of only 1โ2% can be enough for a sensitive receiver, while the main signal carries on almost unchanged.
The traffic captured this way is still encrypted. The danger is that the attacker now holds a perfect copy of the ciphertext and the key exchange, which is exactly what a Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later attack needs.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped, and How Do Enterprises Detect It?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidge
- ExternalCyberRidge Demonstrates How a Simple Clip-On Coupler Can Silently Harvest 100% of โSecureโ Network TrafficTech Times Singapore ยท Sep 2026
Quantum computers can't break encryption yet. Why act now?
Three reasons: the estimates keep moving closer, the data is being recorded today, and migrations take years.
The estimates are shrinking
- Gartner predicts quantum computing will make traditional asymmetric cryptography unsafe to rely on by 2029, and fully breakable by 2034.
- Google researcher Craig Gidney showed in May 2025 that RSA-2048 could in principle be factored in under a week by a machine with fewer than one million noisy qubits. His 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits, so the resource bar dropped by roughly 20ร.
- The Global Risk Institute's 2025 expert survey puts the chance of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer at 28โ49% within ten years and 51โ70% within fifteen.
The recording is already happening
Because of Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later, the relevant date isn't when a quantum computer appears. It's when your sensitive traffic was captured. Data that must remain secret beyond about 2030 should already be treated as at risk.
Q-Day may not be announced
An adversary who builds a capable machine first has every reason to keep it secret. CyberRidge's guidance is to plan as if the break could come without warning and protect the most sensitive links first.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeHow Can Organizations Prepare for a Quantum Computer That Breaks Encryption Without Warning?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- ExternalGartner: quantum computing will make traditional cryptography unsafe by 2029PostQuantum.com ยท Oct 2024
- External
- ExternalGoogle Researcher Lowers Quantum Bar to Crack RSA EncryptionThe Quantum Insider ยท May 2025
- ExternalQuantum Threat Timeline Report 2025Global Risk Institute ยท Mar 2026
- ExternalโHarvest Now Decrypt Laterโ: Examining Post-Quantum Cryptography and the Data Privacy Risks for Distributed Ledger NetworksFederal Reserve Board (FEDS 2025-093) ยท Sep 2025
Optical exfiltration5 questions
What is fiber tapping?
Fiber tapping is the interception of data on a fiber optic cable by extracting part of the light signal it carries. The attacker copies the data while the rest of the light continues to its destination, so service is not interrupted. Fiber tapping is a physical attack on data in transit. It is mainly a risk on wide area network (WAN) fiber that runs through manholes, shared ducts, and amplifier huts.
Common methods include bending the fiber so light leaks into a clip-on coupler, and inserting an optical splitter that diverts a small share of the light. Attackers usually gain access at manholes, street cabinets, communication tunnels and undersea cables. A tap captures encrypted traffic as ciphertext. That ciphertext can be stored and attacked later in a harvest now, decrypt later attack.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
Can a fiber optic cable be tapped without being detected?
Yes. A fiber optic cable can be tapped without being detected, because a tap needs only a small fraction of the light to copy the data. Modern optical receivers can recover data from a very small amount of captured light. A clip-on coupler that bends the fiber can extract that light without cutting the cable or interrupting service.
The power loss from such a tap can fall within the normal variation of a working link. Fiber links are designed with a margin for loss, so a small drop often triggers no alarm. Most networks also lack monitoring at the physical layer. Even when a tap is found, any data it already recorded remains in the attacker's hands.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
- ExternalReport on the 2003 optical eavesdropping device on Verizon's network and fiber-tap demonstrationsThe Register ยท 2007
What are the main methods attackers use to intercept data on a fiber optic network?
Attackers intercept data on a fiber optic network either with physical taps on the cable or with digital methods that divert traffic. Physical methods include macrobending, splitting and access at network entry points. Digital methods include traffic rerouting, compromised network equipment and packet sniffing.
- Macrobending bends the fiber past a set radius, typically 6.5 to 7.5 cm, so light leaks out into a clip-on coupler.
- Splitting inserts an optical splitter that diverts a small share of the light to a recorder. It suits high-volume trunk lines and undersea cables.
- Entry points such as manholes, street cabinets and tunnels give attackers a place to install equipment.
- Rerouting abuses routing protocols such as BGP, the system networks use to choose paths, to pull traffic through a server the attacker controls.
- Compromised routers and switches can mirror traffic to outside storage.
In every case, encrypted traffic can be copied and kept. Photonic layer security addresses interception on the fiber itself.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
Where along a fiber route can data be exfiltrated?
Wherever the glass can be physically reached. On land that means street cabinets, manholes, junction boxes, communication tunnels and splice points along carrier routes. On subsea routes, the exposure concentrates at the shore ends: ENISA considers eavesdropping on the open seabed unlikely but access at cable landing points feasible.
Repair work widens the exposure. Fixing a cable means opening it and splicing fibers by hand, which can leave bare fiber accessible while the work is under way.
A practical first step is an inventory of each link's landing stations, carriers, cabinets and manholes, and of the parties who can authorize access to them.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeHow Can Enterprises Protect Subsea and Terrestrial Fiber Links From Interception?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped During Repair and Maintenance Work?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped, and How Do Enterprises Detect It?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
If our traffic is encrypted, why does optical exfiltration still matter?
Encryption controls who can read a copy. It does not stop the copy being made.
Layer 1 optical encryption, such as AES-256 in-flight encryption on transponders, MACsec and IPsec all put ciphertext on a normal, well-formed optical signal. A tap records that stream in full, together with the key exchange. The recording can then be stored and decrypted later if a key is lost or stolen, if the encryption was implemented incorrectly, or if cryptanalysis advances, which is the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later pattern.
Photonic Layer Security closes that gap by changing the light itself, so what an exfiltration captures is noise rather than a storable copy of the ciphertext.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeHow to Implement Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission for Data in TransitCyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Is Layer 1 Optical Encryption, and How Does It Differ from MACsec and IPsec?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Are the Best Secure Optical Transmission Technologies for Preventing Data Recording?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
Photonic Layer Security7 questions
What is photonic layer security?
Photonic layer security (PLS) protects data in transit on fiber links by changing the optical signal so that an intercepted copy contains no recoverable data. Encryption scrambles the data but leaves a clean signal that a tap can record. PLS works on the light itself, at Layer 1, so a tap captures optical noise instead of ciphertext.
PLS works in three steps. It spreads the signal across a wide band of light and scrambles it with keys that change constantly. It then sends the signal at a level below the background noise on the fiber. Only a receiver with the matching key can rebuild the data. Carmel, CyberRidge's proprietary technology, is built on PLS and is used across live deployments in Europe and Asia.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsJournal of Lightwave Technology, Vol. 43, Issue 4 ยท 2025 ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
How does photonic layer security stop harvest now, decrypt later attacks?
Photonic layer security (PLS) stops harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) attacks by preventing the harvest. HNDL depends on an attacker recording encrypted traffic today and decrypting it once the keys can be broken or undermined. PLS turns the signal on the fiber into optical noise, so a tap records nothing that can be decrypted later.
PLS spreads the signal across the optical spectrum, encodes it with continuously changing keys, and sends it below the fiber's noise level. A recording made by a tap contains no recoverable copy of the data. Because of this, the protection does not depend on how computing advances, whether quantum, classical or AI-assisted. If nothing usable was recorded, no future technique can decrypt it.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsJournal of Lightwave Technology, Vol. 43, Issue 4 ยท 2025 ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge product deckCyberRidge
Does photonic layer security replace post-quantum cryptography?
No. Photonic layer security (PLS) does not replace post-quantum cryptography (PQC), because the two protect against different parts of the same threat. PQC replaces public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECDH, which a future quantum computer and AI algorithms are expected to break. PLS stops encrypted traffic on a fiber link from being recorded at all.
PQC still produces ciphertext, and an optical exfiltration attempt can copy that ciphertext off the fiber. If a flaw later appears in a PQC algorithm or its implementation is flawed, the stored traffic becomes exposed. PLS removes that copy on the links it protects. PQC also covers what PLS does not, including digital signatures, metadata, and links without PLS. PQC migration takes years. Under Executive Order 14412, US federal agencies must adopt PQC for key establishment by December 31, 2030. PLS protects WAN fiber links during that migration and after it.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
- ExternalExecutive Order 14412: Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic AttacksFederal Register ยท Jun 2026
Does Photonic layer security create distance limitations?
Photonic layer security (PLS), as implemented in Carmel, supports fiber spans of up to 100 km without amplification. It is also compatible with standard optical amplifiers (EDFA and Raman), so links can extend beyond 100 km. PLS therefore does not have the hard distance limit that applies to quantum key distribution (QKD).
QKD sends keys using single photons, which cannot pass through standard in-line amplifiers. That keeps most QKD links under roughly 100 km, often on dedicated fiber. PLS works with the amplifiers already in carrier networks. Carmel has been validated over Raman and EDFA amplification, networks with multiple optical switching nodes (ROADMs) and multi-vendor DWDM systems.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCarmel Technical Specifications data sheetCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
How is Photonic Layer Security different from optical (Layer 1) encryption?
Optical encryption changes the bits the light carries. Photonic Layer Security changes the light on the fiber.
- Layer 1 optical encryption encrypts the payload inside an optical transport frame, typically with AES-256, and sends it as a standard optical signal. A tap can copy, demodulate and store a complete stream of ciphertext. It controls who can read a recorded copy.
- Photonic Layer Security reshapes the signal so that what a tap copies has no recoverable structure. It controls whether a usable copy can be recorded at all.
The two answer different questions and complement each other. Where a link already uses Layer 1 encryption, PLS can be added alongside it.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeWhat Is Photonic Layer Security, and How Is It Different from Optical Encryption?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Is Layer 1 Optical Encryption, and How Does It Differ from MACsec and IPsec?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
What does a fiber tap record under each security technology?
| Tap detection (OTDR, power monitoring) | The full signal; raises an alarm when the light on the fiber changes |
|---|---|
| MACsec and IPsec | Encrypted frames or packets, with Ethernet or outer IP headers visible |
| Layer 1 optical encryption | The encrypted wavelength; the ciphertext copy remains |
| Post-quantum cryptography | Encrypted traffic; the key exchange is quantum-resistant but the ciphertext copy remains |
| Quantum key distribution | Encrypted traffic; only key delivery is protected |
| Photonic Layer Security (Carmel) | Optical noise with no recoverable signal |
Every option except PLS protects the contents of a recording, protects the keys, or detects the tap. PLS is the one designed to prevent the recording.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeWhat Are the Best Secure Optical Transmission Technologies for Preventing Data Recording?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Is Layer 1 Optical Encryption, and How Does It Differ from MACsec and IPsec?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
Where does Photonic Layer Security apply, and where doesn't it?
PLS is built for wide area network (WAN) fiber links: the long spans where traffic leaves a controlled network and crosses infrastructure that other parties own, and where the tap access points sit. It protects the link between a matched pair of units, one at each end.
It does not cover traffic inside a building, data on endpoints, data at rest, or access by insiders with valid credentials. Those are handled by access control, endpoint security and monitoring, and PLS works alongside them. It also cannot protect traffic that was recorded before it was installed.
The strongest candidates are high-capacity links carrying data that must stay confidential for years.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeWhat Are the Best Secure Optical Transmission Technologies for Preventing Data Recording?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Is Photonic Layer Security, and How Is It Different from Optical Encryption?CyberRidge Insights ยท Nov 2026
CyberRidge & Carmel10 questions
What is CyberRidge?
CyberRidge is an Israeli deep-tech cybersecurity company that protects data in transit on fiber links. The proprietary photonic layer security (PLS) technology changes the optical signal itself so an optical exfiltration attempt cannot record any data. The flagship product, Carmel, is an ideal solution for protecting fiber links that connect remote sites, data centers, and regions.
CyberRidge is based in Tel Aviv. It was founded by Prof. Dan Sadot, who has led the Optical Communications Research Laboratory at Ben-Gurion University since 1996. The PLS technology is built on peer-reviewed research published in the Journal of Lightwave Technology. CyberRidge has raised $26 million with co-funding from the European Innovation Council.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsJournal of Lightwave Technology, Vol. 43, Issue 4 ยท 2025 ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge Named a Cool Vendor by GartnerCyberRidge Blog ยท 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge Emerges From Stealth With $26 Million for Photonic Encryption SolutionSecurityWeek ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $16M Series A to launch photonic encryption that turns data into optical noiseCalcalist (CTech) ยท Oct 2025
What is Carmel by CyberRidge?
Carmel is CyberRidge's frontier technology for securing data in transit on WAN fiber links. The solution works at Layer 1 optical transmission. This is the physical layer of a network, where data travels as light. Carmel applies photonic layer security (PLS), which turns the transmitted signal into optical noise. Any attempt to optically exfiltrate the signal from the fiber captures nothing that can be stored and decrypted later.
Carmel is installed as a matched pair of units, one at each end of a fiber link. Each unit is a 3U, 19-inch rack-mounted system with a 100 - 400 Gb/s uplink and standard 100GbE client interfaces. By spreading the optical signal across a wide spectral band and embedding it under a controlled layer of noise, it ensures that what flows across the fiber appears meaningless and unusable to any observer. Encryption keys change continuously, they are changed every fraction of a second by an air-gapped key generator and are embedded in the light itself, so there is never anything to target.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCarmel Technical Specifications data sheetCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge product deckCyberRidge
What problem does Carmel solve?
Carmel solves the problem of encrypted data being copied off fiber links and stored for later decryption. This attack is known as harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL). Encryption scrambles data, but the scrambled ciphertext still travels as a clean optical signal that can be recorded. Once stored, that copy can be exposed with quantum, classical, or AI-assisted methods.
Carmel removes a signal that can be recorded. It transmits data at the physical layer as optical noise, so a tap on the fiber captures nothing usable. Carmel works beneath existing encryption, including post-quantum cryptography, rather than replacing it, ensuring a physical layer of protection to complement digital cryptography layers.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge HNDL whitepaperCyberRidge
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsJournal of Lightwave Technology, Vol. 43, Issue 4 ยท 2025 ยท CyberRidge research
How is Carmel installed in an existing optical network?
Carmel is installed as an overlay on an existing optical network. A matched pair of Carmel units is placed at the two ends of the fiber link being protected. Client equipment connects to Carmel through standard 100GbE interfaces. The protected signal then runs over the existing fiber and DWDM system, the cabling that carries many wavelengths on one fiber.
Carmel requires no changes to existing DWDM equipment and works with optical transport from any vendor. It shares the C-band with up to five conventional wavelengths, so the rest of the link keeps running as before. Carmel has been validated over Raman and EDFA amplification, networks with multiple optical switching nodes (ROADMs) and multi-vendor DWDM systems. A typical deployment runs in three phases over four weeks. The phases involve parallel installation with no downtime, testing on non-critical traffic, and then moving critical traffic onto a Carmel-protected link.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge product deckCyberRidge
How does the signal become noise?
The process has three stages, all performed optically:
- Spread. The data is carried on a mode-locked laser whose output spans several terahertz of optical spectrum. CyberRidge sources its femtosecond laser technology through a partnership with Menhir Photonics, whose lasers produce ultrashort pulses that stay coherent across a very wide spectrum.
- Key. A dynamic phase modulator changes the optical phase of each spectral component according to the current key, and the key changes every fraction of a second.
- Bury. The signal is strongly attenuated, and true random amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise from optical amplifiers is added. The signal ends up below the noise floor, at a low or negative optical signal-to-noise ratio OSNR < 0 dB.
Why the data can't be recovered from a tap
Information theory sets a hard limit on how much can be extracted from a signal at negative OSNR. Without the right phase key applied optically, at the right moment, the signal is destroyed as soon as the light is converted to an electrical signal. An eavesdropper therefore cannot record now and process later. Published CyberRidge research demonstrated error-free recovery by the legitimate receiver at around โ7.5 dB OSNR, a level at which an outside observer sees only noise.
At the authorized receiver, the process runs in reverse: the matching key is applied optically, the signal is de-spread and pulled out of the noise, and only then converted to electrical data.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeClosing the Harvesting GapCyberRidge Blog
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge & Menhir Photonics partnershipCyberRidge Blog
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgePhotonic Encryption fundamentalsOptics Express ยท CyberRidge research
How are encryption keys managed?
CyberRidge uses Constantly Changing Encryption keys (CCE).
- Embedded in the light. Key distribution travels inside the optical signal itself, so there is no separate key channel to attack.
- Short-lived. The key changes every fraction of a second. By the time anyone could isolate one, it is no longer in use.
- Never stored. Keys are not kept on disk or in a key vault. They exist only in transit.
- Air-gapped generation. Keys come from an isolated, air-gapped processor that is unique to each authorized link.
Why this matters
Most real-world encryption failures don't involve breaking the math. They involve stealing, leaking, bribing for or replaying keys. CCE is designed to remove those routes, because there is no long-lived key to steal and no recorded ciphertext to apply a stolen key to.
It also separates two problems that are often confused. Post-quantum cryptography, symmetric key systems and QKD all decide how keys are created and exchanged. None of them stops the protected traffic from being copied off the fiber. CyberRidge protects the signal itself.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Is the Best Hybrid Quantum-Safe Network Strategy for Telecom Operators?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
Why is it immune to quantum computers?
Quantum computers are powerful at specific mathematical problems, such as factoring the large numbers that RSA depends on. They still need data to work on.
With CyberRidge, an eavesdropper never obtains that data. What a tap captures is analog optical noise. The structure that would allow reconstruction only exists inside the authorized receiver, for a fraction of a second, while the correct key is applied to the light. Once the signal has passed the tap point, the information is gone for anyone without that key at that moment.
So the protection doesn't rely on a problem being hard to compute. It relies on physics: there is no recorded information to compute on. That holds against classical supercomputers, AI-assisted cryptanalysis and quantum computers alike, today and in the future.
CyberRidge's peer-reviewed cryptanalysis paper examines practical attacks against this kind of optical-layer security and sets out the conditions under which the system stays secure.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCryptanalysis of Practical Optical Layer SecurityIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- External
Is metadata protected too?
Yes. Conventional encryption protects the content of traffic, but much can still be learned from an encrypted stream: who is talking to whom, when, how often and how much. That traffic analysis is valuable intelligence on its own.
Because CyberRidge buries the entire optical signal under noise, nothing about the traffic is visible on the fiber. Payload, headers, timing patterns and volumes are all hidden. CyberRidge describes this as metadata elimination and stealth transmission: to an observer the link looks like a channel carrying only noise.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped, and How Do Enterprises Detect It?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeClosing the Harvesting GapCyberRidge Blog
What if an attacker gets hold of a Carmel unit?
This was one of the two attack scenarios tested in Vodafone's lab evaluation of Carmel.
- Naive attacker: an optical tap on the line. The attacker harvested only scrambled noise, because the signal sat below the noise floor.
- Rogue transceiver: a man-in-the-middle using a stolen Carmel unit. Keys are generated by an air-gapped processor and are unique to the authorized link, so the rogue unit could not synchronize with the key sequence and could not de-noise or decrypt the traffic.
CyberRidge reports that the system held up under both simulations. Carmel units work in matched pairs, one at each end of a protected link, and possession of the hardware alone does not give access to a link's keys.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
Is the technology peer-reviewed?
Yes. The approach is patented and grew out of about eight years of academic research in Prof. Dan Sadot's optical communications lab at Ben-Gurion University, before CyberRidge was founded. The core work is published in peer-reviewed journals:
- Photonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical Communications (IEEE) describes the photonic shield that spreads and phase-encodes data so it can't be recorded, with traffic and key exchange sharing one channel at up to 200 Gb/s.
- Photonic Encryption in field trial (IEEE) reports a 100 Gb/s signal carried 200 km while hidden under optical noise, running alongside seven standard DWDM channels.
- Cryptanalysis of Practical Optical Layer Security (IEEE) analyzes three attack approaches and defines the conditions under which the system remains secure.
- Photonic Encryption fundamentals (Optics Express) sets out the all-optical stealth scheme and reports error-free 20 Gb/s recovery at โ7.5 dB OSNR.
The work has also been reviewed by the European Innovation Council, which co-funds CyberRidge under Horizon project 101218274.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgePhotonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical CommunicationsIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgePhotonic Encryption in field trialIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgeCryptanalysis of Practical Optical Layer SecurityIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgePhotonic Encryption fundamentalsOptics Express ยท CyberRidge research
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $16M Series A to launch photonic encryption that turns data into optical noiseCalcalist (CTech) ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge all-optical stealth and secured solution (EIC project 101218274)CORDIS ยท European Commission ยท 2025
PQC Complementarity3 questions
How is this different from Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)?
QKD and CyberRidge both use physics, but they protect different things.
What QKD protects
QKD uses quantum properties of light to exchange encryption keys in a way that reveals eavesdropping. That makes the key exchange very strong. The data itself still travels as conventional, recordable ciphertext.
Practical limits commonly cited for QKD
- It protects keys only, so traffic can still be harvested.
- Reach is typically limited to around 80โ100 km per span, and no commercial quantum repeater exists yet, which rules out most long-haul and subsea routes without trusted relay nodes.
- It doesn't pass through standard in-line optical amplifiers.
- It often needs dedicated fiber and specialized equipment, which drives up cost.
- Large-scale operational QKD isn't expected before about 2030, and the U.S. NSA does not currently recommend QKD for national security systems, favoring post-quantum algorithms instead.
How CyberRidge differs
CyberRidge protects the entire signal so nothing usable can be recorded. It runs over standard single-mode fiber, works with EDFA and Raman amplifiers, and is installed as a line-card replacement on existing infrastructure.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Is the Best Hybrid Quantum-Safe Network Strategy for Telecom Operators?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- CyberRidgeClosing the Harvesting GapCyberRidge Blog
- ExternalPost-Quantum Cybersecurity Resources (CNSA 2.0)U.S. National Security Agency
Does CyberRidge replace our existing security? What doesn't it do?
No. CyberRidge adds an independent layer under everything you already run. It is fully complementary to higher-layer encryption such as MACsec, IPsec and TLS, and to PQC. You don't need to change protocols, routing, applications or identity systems.
What Carmel protects
Data in transit on the optical fiber between two Carmel units, including its metadata, against interception and later decryption.
What it does not do
- It does not protect endpoints, applications or data at rest.
- It does not replace authentication, access control or identity management.
- It does not detect or physically prevent a tap; it makes what the tap captures useless.
- It does not protect wireless or cellular segments of a path.
- It cannot protect traffic that was already recorded before it was installed.
CyberRidge recommends treating Carmel as one layer in a defense-in-depth strategy, the layer that covers the physical fiber.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeHow Does CyberRidge Deliver Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission, and How Is It Deployed?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeCan Fiber Optic Cables Be Tapped, and How Do Enterprises Detect It?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeHow Do NeoCloud Providers Protect AI Training Data Moving Between Remote GPU Data Centers?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Does Layered Network Security Look Like in the AI Era?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
How does this fit with post-quantum deadlines and regulations?
Governments have set firm dates for moving to quantum-safe cryptography. The main ones:
- United States, civilian: Executive Order 14412, signed 22 June 2026, requires high-value federal systems to use post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. Covered federal contractors are expected to comply by the end of 2030.
- United States, national security: the NSA's CNSA 2.0 suite expects new National Security System acquisitions to be compliant from 1 January 2027, networking equipment such as VPNs and routers to use CNSA 2.0 exclusively by 2030, and most transitions complete by 2033, within an overall 2035 goal.
- United Kingdom: the NCSC's March 2025 roadmap asks organizations to finish discovery and planning by 2028, complete priority upgrades by 2031 and migrate everything by 2035.
- European Union: the June 2025 coordinated roadmap asks member states to have national plans by 2026, move critical systems in defense, energy, finance and health by 2030, and complete the transition by 2035.
Where CyberRidge fits
These rules require PQC, and CyberRidge doesn't change those obligations. Carmel complements them: it protects your most sensitive fiber links from harvesting today, during the years it takes to meet the deadlines, and keeps protecting them afterwards.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCNSA 2.0 Deadlines and What Government and Defense Contractors Must Do to ComplyCyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeHow Long Does Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration Take, and What Protects Data in Transit While It's Underway?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- ExternalExecutive Order 14412: Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic AttacksFederal Register ยท Jun 2026
- ExternalPost-Quantum Cybersecurity Resources (CNSA 2.0)U.S. National Security Agency
- ExternalPQC migration roadmap unveiledUK National Cyber Security Centre ยท Mar 2025
- ExternalNCSC Sets 2035 Deadline for Post-Quantum Cryptography MigrationInfosecurity Magazine ยท Mar 2025
- ExternalEU unveils roadmap for post-quantum cryptographyINCYBER News ยท Jun 2025
- ExternalEU charts roadmap for transition to quantum-resistant cryptography by 2035CyberInsider ยท 2025
Use Cases and Deployment7 questions
Will it slow down our network?
No. Carmel processes the optical signal in-line, as the light passes through. It doesn't hold, queue or buffer packets, and it doesn't add a separate encryption appliance in the path, so CyberRidge reports zero added latency. Vodafone's lab evaluation found only negligible latency despite the noise loading.
That matters for traffic where every microsecond counts: trading links, data center replication, real-time control systems and distributed AI training. Many software and appliance encryption options add processing delay on those paths; a physical-layer approach avoids it.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Are CyberRidge's Integration and Deployment Options for Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
How long does deployment take?
CyberRidge reports deployment in weeks, not years, to reach Post-Quantum Ready (PQR) status on a protected link. The exact time depends on how many links are involved and how complex the network is.
Compare that with a full PQC migration, which national guidance from the UK and EU spreads over roughly ten years, from discovery around 2026โ2028 to completion by 2035. Because Carmel works at the physical layer and needs no protocol or application changes, it can protect your highest-priority links almost immediately while that longer program runs.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Are CyberRidge's Integration and Deployment Options for Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeHow Long Does Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration Take, and What Protects Data in Transit While It's Underway?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
Which network topologies are supported?
- Point to point: a secure high-speed link between two endpoints, typically over private fiber. This is the usual fit for data center interconnect (DCI) and for connecting a client site to a data center.
- Ring: multi-node ring configurations over private infrastructure, with the whole ring managed centrally through Trekker.
- Full network: metro and long-haul architectures, including multi-vendor DWDM networks with amplifiers, multiple spectral bands and alien wavelengths, without disrupting existing services.
CyberRidge's tier-1 telco case study describes a deployment in a carrier network.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeUse casesCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Are CyberRidge's Integration and Deployment Options for Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidge
Does it work on long-haul and submarine cables?
Yes. Carmel runs over standard single-mode fiber, including terrestrial and submarine links. A single span reaches up to about 100 km without amplification, and longer routes are supported with standard EDFA or Raman amplifiers. Unlike QKD, it is compatible with in-line amplification, which is what makes long-haul and subsea use practical.
Tested distances
- 200 km of fiber in Telecom Italia's optical labs in Turin
- 205 km in Vodafone's optical network lab in Eschborn, Germany
- 150 km of fiber in Singapore
Subsea routes are a particular concern because repairs expose bare fibers and ships can loiter over cables in international waters. That makes subsea links a natural early candidate for photonic-layer protection.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgePhotonic Encryption in field trialIEEE ยท CyberRidge research
- CyberRidgeHow Long Does Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration Take, and What Protects Data in Transit While It's Underway?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $26m to thwart post quantum threatGlobes ยท Oct 2025
What is Trekker?
Trekker is the network management system (NMS) for the Carmel product line. It is a secure, centralized platform that gives operations teams:
- Complete visibility of system components and network links
- Simple setup and lifecycle management
- Real-time monitoring and alerts
- An interface designed for day-to-day operations and fast troubleshooting
- AI-assisted analytics to spot developing issues early and act before they affect service
Trekker is optional for single links and is used to manage rings and larger deployments centrally.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeMeet CarmelCyberRidge
- CyberRidgeWhat Are CyberRidge's Integration and Deployment Options for Unrecordable High-Speed Optical Transmission?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
Can it protect AI data moving between GPU data centers?
Yes, and this is a growing use case. GPU capacity is increasingly built where power and land are available, often far from dense fiber. Model weights, training data and checkpoints then travel over long wide-area links that the operator doesn't fully control.
Those assets are high-value targets. RAND's 2024 study on securing AI model weights identified 38 distinct attack vectors and concluded that no single measure is enough; protection needs many layers. Most providers encrypt inter-site traffic with MACsec, IPsec or TLS, which protects content but still leaves ciphertext on the fiber to be copied.
Carmel adds the physical layer: a tap on an inter-site link captures only noise, and with no added latency it doesn't slow distributed training or replication.
Suggested first steps
- List the cryptography protecting each inter-site link.
- Rank spans that carry weights, checkpoints or customer data.
- Define how long that data must stay confidential.
- Walk the physical route, focusing on unmonitored segments.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeHow Do NeoCloud Providers Protect AI Training Data Moving Between Remote GPU Data Centers?CyberRidge Insights ยท Sep 2026
- CyberRidgeWhat Does Layered Network Security Look Like in the AI Era?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- ExternalSecuring AI Model Weights: Preventing Theft and Misuse of Frontier ModelsRAND Corporation ยท May 2024
What's the right quantum-safe strategy for a telecom operator?
CyberRidge recommends that operators treat two problems separately:
- Key management: how keys are created and exchanged, using PQC, symmetric key infrastructure or, where it fits, QKD.
- Payload protection: whether the transmitted signal itself can be harvested from the fiber.
None of the key-management options stops ciphertext being copied off the line. A hybrid strategy pairs strong key management with physical-layer protection on the links that carry long-lived sensitive traffic, especially wholesale, government and enterprise services.
Practical checks
- Assess HNDL exposure for long-lived customer data. The Global Risk Institute's 2025 survey gives roughly even odds of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer within fifteen years.
- Check QKD's distance and amplifier constraints against your actual topology before committing to it.
- Ask any vendor, including CyberRidge, for independent test data. Vodafone's lab evaluation and the tier-1 telco case study are good starting points.
For operators, photonic-layer security can also be sold on as a premium, quantum-safe transport service to enterprise and government customers.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeWhat Is the Best Hybrid Quantum-Safe Network Strategy for Telecom Operators?CyberRidge Insights ยท Oct 2026
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- ExternalQuantum Threat Timeline Report 2025Global Risk Institute ยท Mar 2026
Customers & company4 questions
Who is CyberRidge built for?
Organizations whose data in transit must stay confidential for years, and whose traffic crosses fiber they don't fully control. Gartner identifies those with the highest data protection requirements as benefiting most:
- Telecom operators and communication service providers
- Cloud providers, hyperscalers, colocation and NeoCloud GPU operators
- Banks, exchanges and other financial institutions
- Government agencies, defense organizations and their contractors
- Intelligence and critical-infrastructure operators
- Healthcare providers and research institutions
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge Named a Cool Vendor by GartnerCyberRidge Blog ยท 2025
- CyberRidgeUse casesCyberRidge
- ExternalCyberRidge Ltd โ company profileIsrael Innovation Authority
Who is already using it, and what recognition has it received?
Deployments and trials
- Defense, intelligence and telecom organizations in Europe, Australia and Singapore have deployed or are testing the system.
- An elite unit of the IDF Intelligence Directorate is a customer; an Israeli security agency running it in an operational system was reported as the first major paying customer.
- Telecom Italia tested it over 200 km of fiber in its Turin labs, and FiberCop noted that it integrates into legacy networks without distance or amplification limits.
- Vodafone evaluated Carmel in its Eschborn optical lab over 205 km, as an alien wavelength over a third-party line system.
- A live-environment cooperation in Singapore runs under the SingaporeโIsrael Industrial R&D programme (SIIRD), and a test was run at one of the world's largest cloud providers.
Recognition
- Named a Cool Vendor in Gartner's Cool Vendors in Data Security, 2025.
- Carmel was a finalist for Best Emerging Technology in the 2026 SC Awards.
- Co-funded by the European Innovation Council (Horizon project 101218274).
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge Named a Cool Vendor by GartnerCyberRidge Blog ยท 2025
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge's Carmel Platform Named Finalist in 2026 SC Awards for Best Emerging TechnologyCyberRidge Blog ยท Mar 2026
- CyberRidge
- CyberRidgeCyberRidge & Menhir Photonics partnershipCyberRidge Blog
- ExternalCyberRidge Emerges From Stealth With $26 Million for Photonic Encryption SolutionSecurityWeek ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $16M Series A to launch photonic encryption that turns data into optical noiseCalcalist (CTech) ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $26m to thwart post quantum threatGlobes ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge's Carmel Platform Named Finalist in 2026 SC Awards for Best Emerging TechnologyAP News (press release) ยท Mar 2026
Who is behind CyberRidge?
CyberRidge is a Tel Aviv-based deep-tech security company founded by Prof. Dan Sadot, a researcher and serial entrepreneur in optical communications and photonic cryptography at Ben-Gurion University. CyberRidge is his fifth startup. The technology came out of about eight years of work in his lab before the company was formally established.
The team of about 20 in Israel is drawn largely from Ben-Gurion University graduates and elite IDF intelligence units, with additional teams in the U.S.
Funding
CyberRidge came out of stealth in October 2025 with $26 million in total funding:
- A $10 million seed round led by Awz Ventures
- A $16 million Series A from Arkin Capital, Redseed VC and Elron Ventures, together with an EU EIC Horizon grant
Sources & further reading
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $26m to thwart post quantum threatGlobes ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $16M Series A to launch photonic encryption that turns data into optical noiseCalcalist (CTech) ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge Emerges From Stealth With $26 Million for Photonic Encryption SolutionSecurityWeek ยท Oct 2025
- External
- External
- ExternalCyberRidge raises $26m for photonic data securityRegTech Analyst ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge Raises $26 Million to Make Your Most Sensitive Data Disappear (and reappear)Yahoo Finance (press release) ยท Oct 2025
- ExternalCyberRidge all-optical stealth and secured solution (EIC project 101218274)CORDIS ยท European Commission ยท 2025
How much does it cost, and can we run an evaluation?
Pricing depends on the number of links, the topology, data rates and whether Trekker is used to manage multiple sites. CyberRidge scopes each deployment with the customer.
To discuss your network, request detailed specifications or plan a proof of concept, contact the CyberRidge team at contact@cyber-ridge.com. A useful first conversation covers which links carry your most sensitive long-lived data, their distances and amplification, and the DWDM equipment in place.
Sources & further reading
- CyberRidgeContact CyberRidgeCyberRidge
Leave your adversaries with nothing to harvest
Didn't find your answer? Contact the CyberRidge team for pricing, a technical deep-dive or to scope an evaluation on your network.
ContactLast updated November 2026